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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
THOMAS F. KIRKHAM, Administra- I 
tor of the Estate of William Kirkham, 
Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ORIEN A. SPENCER and VIOLA 
SPENCER, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. I 
Case No. 8291 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent agrees with the statement of facts set 
out in appellants' brief, but deem it necessary to make a more 
detailed statement concerning the evidence and testimony of 
the witnesses than was contained in said brief. We will, there-
fore, undertake to set forth the facts as developed by both 
parties. 
The Respondent was granted judgment on his complaint 
on file herein for unlawful detainer in the Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict Court. From this judgment the defendants appealed. 
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The facts are as follows: 
That on or about January 25, 1952, the deceased, William 
Kirkham, entered into a written contract of sale of real prop-
erty to the defendants, Orien A. Spencer and Viola Spencer, 
his wife, which property is the subject of this action and is 
correctly described in paragraph 3 of the complaint. The 
contract provided for payment by the purchasers of $65.00 
per month, or more, commencing on February 1, 1952, to-
gether with interest at 5% per annum on the unpaid balance. 
The monthly payments were to be applied first to interest 
upon the unpaid balance, and then the balance being applied 
to principal. The defendants went into possession under the 
contract, the original of which is plaintiff's exhibit A in the 
record, and have continued to occupy the pretnises since that 
time. 
Pretrial was held on the 8th day of October, 1954, wherein 
the parties were properly represented by their counsel. A stipu-
lation was entered into by counsel and accepted by the Court 
through a pre-trial order. It was stipulated among other things 
that the plaintiff, Thomas F. Kirkham, is the duly appointed, 
qualified and acting administrator of the Estate of William 
Kirkham, deceased, having been appointed on October 2, 
1953. That the contract of sale hereinbefore described is accu-
rate. The only issue of fact reserved for trial was stated in the 
pretrial order as follows: 
" ( 1) Did the defendants pay to the plaintiff's de-
cedent during the month of August, 1953, the sum 
of $4800.00." 
The evidence pertinent to this issue presented at trial is 
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as follows: Plaintiff Thomas F. Kirkham, Administrator of 
the Estate of William Kirkham, deceased, testified that he was 
a brother of the deceased; that he made up the contracts, made 
all interest calculations; made his bank deposits and acted as 
consultant on many business deals for 10 years or more for 
the deceased; and that this relationship lasted up until the 
death of William Kirkham (Tr. P. 4). 
Plaintiff's exhibit C is the bank book of the deceased show-
ing deposits from 1942 to September 5, 1953 and plaintiff 
testified that he made all of those deposits (Tr. P. 5). 
William Kirkham died on September 6, 1953 as a result 
of a sudden stroke. 
Plaintiff further testified that he went on vacation m 
August, 195 ;, and returned home August 22, 195 3, the day 
after the date shown on defendants' exhibit 3. Two or three days 
later William Kirkham came to him and expressed a concern 
about the delinquent Spencer contract. Plaintiff recommended 
that he quit worrying and turn the contract over to the attorney 
he had before for collection (Tr. P. 9). That the papers 
were delivered about a week after his return from vacation 
to Attorney Harvard R. Hinton with instructions to collect 
the same, making the date of delivery approximately August 
30, 1953 (Tr. P. 10, 11). 
That as administrator he collected the assets of the estate 
and filed an inventory; that he did not collect $4800.00, nor 
was any large sum of money found in deceased's assets or 
belongings (Tr. P. 12) and that no other bank account was 
ever found in the name of the decedent ( T r. P. 13) . 
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That plaintiff always prepared deeds for his brother's 
real estate transactions and that he was never requested by 
his brother to prepare any deed for defendants nor was he 
ever requested to make any interest calculations in regard to 
payment of the Spencer contract (Tr. P. 13). 
That the contract marked exhbiit A was a part of the 
assets of the estate and is the same contract that was turned 
over to the attorney for collection (Tr. P. 14). 
Cleo K. Beagley, a daughter of the deceased, testified 
that she participated in collecting the assets of the estate along 
with the rest of the members of the family and went through 
their father's belongings and turned the papers over to the 
Administrator (Tr. p. 38). And further that they went through 
everything, making a thorough search and did not find any 
cash (Tr. p. 39). That her family consisted of her and her 
sister and two brothers. 
At the conclusion of Mrs. Beagley's testimony plaintiff 
rested and defendant made a motion to dismiss on the grounds 
that a prima facie case had not been proved. The trial judge 
ruled "That there was a prima facie case made that the 
$4800.00 was not paid. It is not included in the accounts, the 
witnesses did not find it, and therefore the motion is denied" 
(Tr. p. 43). 
Thereupon defendants called Mr. Creel, a handwriting 
expert, who testified that the signature on defendants' exhibit 
3, the purported receipt, was that of William Kirkham, the 
deceased. At this time counsel for defendants stipul,ated that 
the handwriting on the remainder of the purported receipt 
was not the same handwriting as the signature (Tr. p. 48). 
6 
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., ~ Defendant Orien Spencer was sworn as a witness but was 
not allowed to testify as to dealings regarding defendants' 
exhibit No. 3 under the so-called "dead man's" statute. Coun-
sel for defendant did not attempt to introduce any competent, 
relevant evidence concerning the issue before the court and 
thereupon rested. 
Plaintiff in rebuttal called Harvard R. Hinton to the 
witness stand and he test:fiied that a delinquent contract between 
William Kirkham and Orien Spencer and his wife was de-
livered to him on August 29th or 30th for collection purposes. 
That he wrote and mailed a letter on September 1, 1953 to the 
defendant Orien Spencer regarding this contract and that 
Spencer did not come around to see about it until September 
29th (Tr. p. 54, 55). 
The court thereafter on its own motion ordered the matter 
reopened for further evidence after having taken the case under 
advisement. The order of the court came after it had examined 
and weighed the evidence presented and was not satisfied 
on two points available to the parties. Indicating that this 
evidence would be of great assistance to the court in determin-
ing the merits of the cause, it ordered the rest of the parties 
set aside in order to give the respective parties an oppor-
tunity to present evidence on the two points, namely: " ( 1) 
Evidence concerning the possession by the defendants of the 
sum of $4800.00 in cash which could have been, or which 
probably was, paid to deceased on or about the 21st day of 
August, 1953. (2) Further evidence of the search by plaintiff 
and/ or the heirs of the decedent made either before or after 
the bringing on of the cause for trial to discover the possession 
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of $4800.00 in money in the decedent after the 21st day of 
August, 1953, including banks in the cities of Lehi, American 
Fork, Pleasant Grove, Provo, and Salt Lake City, and a more 
detailed search of the premises wherein deceased lived after 
August 21, 195;., and any other locations known to the heirs 
and representatives of the decedent wherein the said decedent 
might have made temporary disposition of $4800.00 paid 
to him prior to plaintiff's return from vacation on August 22, 
1953." 
The defendants were represented by counsel in court at 
the time set for hearing after reopening. Defendants' attorney 
suggested that plaintiff's witnesses be heard regarding the new 
evidence the plaintiff had to offer (T. p. 66). Later counsel 
voiced an objection to plaintiff being allowed to re-open his 
case. This motion was denied. 
The Administrator Thomas F. Kirkham was recalled to 
the witness stand and testified regarding the number of rooms 
in decedent's house and that the yard was very small. And 
further that since his appointment as administrator he has 
never had any statement, letter, or communication whatever, 
from any person or institution, indicating that there were any 
additional funds in the estate, other than what had been re-
ported (Tr. p. 70, 71). 
Letters from 17 banking institutions including American 
Fork, Pleasant Grove, Provo, Midvale and Salt Lake City 
in Utah and Salt Lake Counties were then placed in evidence 
through the testimony of Thomas F. Kirkham, Cleo K. Beagley 
and Harvard R. Hinton (Tr. p. 72, 79, 85, 98, 99). All letters 
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stated that William Kirkham did not have an account in their 
(;: institutions. 
i··. 1[, 
·. 
Cleo Beagley, m testifying of the completeness of the 
search conducted in the decedent's home, stated they went 
through every room completely, one room at a time, and 
searched the contests including cupboards, rugs, bedding and 
pillows (Tr. p. 86, 87). That no money, safety deposit keys 
or bank statements other than to the Lehi Bank were found. 
Mr. Leslie Goates, son-in-law of the deceased, was present 
at the time the intensive search was made and he reiterated 
what Mrs. Beagley said as to the thoroughness of the search 
(Tr. p. 94). 
Defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of 
prima facie case was again denied (Tr. p. 100). Defendants 
were to present their evidence as requested by the Court on 
November 6, 1954 at 10:00 a.m. 
On November 5, 1954 counsel appeared in court by 
stipulation and counsel for defendants rested without present-
ing further evidence as requested by the court. Counsel for 
plaintiff thereupon made a motion to reopen case to present 
further evidence, which evidence he had been reserving for 
rebuttal purposes and his motion was denied. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Throughout the remainder of this brief plaintiff will be 
referred to as respondents and defendants as appellants. 
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I 
The respondents will argue appellants' points in the order j 
in which they appear in appellants' brief. fl 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END 
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF SHOULD NOT 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR TH·E REASON THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF PROVED A CAUSE OF ACTION AND FOR 
THE REASON THAT THE EVIDENCE PROVED WAS 
SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO REFUSE TO GRANT 
THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR. 
The appellants contend that it was incumbent upon the 
part of the respondent to prove the non-payment during the 
month of August, 1953 the sum of $4800.00 as an essential 
element of their cause of action. 
The respondents contend the instant case was an action 
for unlawful detainer of real property located at Lehi, Utah. 
I 
The allegations and proof of a complaint necessary to 
sustain a cause of action for unlawful detainer are clearly set 
forth in the following decisions of this court: 
Madsen vs. Chournos, 104 U. 280, 139 P. 2nd 225 
Buchanan vs. Crites, 106 U. 428, 150 P. 2nd 100, 104 
Glenn vs. Keyes, 107 U. 415, 154 P. 2nd 642 1 
It is to be noted that all of the allegations of the complaint 
on file herein were admitted by the appellants either in their 
10 
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oer answer to the complaint or in the stipulations entered into 
among the respective parties at the pretrial of the action with 
the exception of non-payment. 
It is to be further noted that the only issue of fact reserved 
for trial as set forth in the pretrial order was stated thus: 
"Did the defendants pay to the plaintiff's decedent during the 
month of August, 1953 the sum of $4800.00 ?"-a fact that 
was raised by the appellants' affirmative defense as set forth 
in their answer to the complaint on file herein. 
The evidence established by the respondent clearly and 
unmistakeably supports the trial court's finding of fact that 
the defendant did not pay to the plaintiff's decedent during 
the month of August, 1953 the sum of $4800.00. 
Said evidence may be summarized as follows: 
Thomas F. Kirkham, Administrator of the Estate of 
William Kirkham, deceased, plaintiff in the case below, testified 
that he was a brother of the decedent and that for more than 
10 years prior to the death of William Kirkham, deceased, 
that he conducted a great deal of decedent's business. He fur-
ther testified that he made all of the contracts for the decedent, 
including the plaintiff's exhibit A. That he made all interest 
calculations on contracts for him; that he prepared deeds and 
other documents for the decedent and that he did all of his 
banking for him. The bank passbook, plaintiff's exhibit C, 
was identified by the witness Thomas F. Kirkham as the book 
used in making these bank deposits. That book shows that 
over 50 deposits were made during the period of 10 years, 
the amounts ranging from $17.50, the lowest, to as high as 
11 
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$6000.00. The decedent died on September 6, 1953. Mr. Har-
vard R. Hinton, who is an attorney for the plaintiff in this 
action, was also counsel for the decedent prior to his death. 
In the forepart of August, 1953, Thomas F. Kirkham, Ad-
ministrator herein, departed on a vacation trip, returning on 
Saturday, August 22, 1953. In the first part of the week follow-
ing, the decedent came to the plaintiff administrator and ex-
pressed some concern over the delinquencies upon contracts, 
specifically mentioning the Spencer contract. Thomas F. Kirk-
ham advised the decedent then to turn his contracts, including 
the Spencer contract, over to his attorney and quit worrying 
about them. Thereafter, either on August 29th or August 30th, 
(after the alleged payment of August 21) the Spencer con-
tract was delivered to Attorney Hinton with instructions to 
collect the delinquencies upon the same. Mr. Hinton then on 
or about September 1, 1953 wrote a letter to the defendants 
concerning their delinquency on this contract but the defendant 
did nothing whatsoever about the matter until September 
29th (nearly a month later) when they came to see Mr. Hinton 
and there for the first time claimed payment of $4800.00. 
As has been stated by the appellants in their brief, evi-
dence supporting a claim of non-payment is usually accom-
plished by the testimony of an obligee that payment was not 
made. 
In the instant case the obligee, William Kirkham, is dead. 
Therefore his actions with respect to the issues of this case after 
the date of the alleged payment, August 21, 1953 and prior 
·to his decease on September 6, 1953 are of primary importance. 
12 
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The evidence without conflict shows that the deceased 
as far as was ascertainable was in good health all during the 
month of August and in the forepart of September, 1953. 
He suffered a sudden stroke on the 4th of September, which 
rendered him immediately unconscious, resulting in his death 
on September 6, 1953. And further evidence shows that the 
deceased never at any time requested his brother Thomas F. 
Kirkham to prepare a deed for him to be delivered to the 
defendants in fulfillment of their contract, and never at any 
time did the deceased ask his brother to make interest calcu-
lations on the defendants' contract. As a matter of fact, the 
evidence as herein stated before, clearly shows that the de-
cedent after the date of the alleged payment and prior to his 
decease complained of delinquencies of the Spencer contract 
to his brother, who normally conducted all of his business for 
him including the preparation of deeds and the calculation of 
interest, and delivered said contract to his attorney to collect 
said delinquencies. The bank pass book, plaintiff's exhibit C, 
further shows that no such sums as claimed by the defendants 
to have been paid to the decedent were deposited to his ac-
count, and that the decedent did not deliver any such sum of 
money to Thomas F. Kirkham, Administrator. The evidence 
further shows that a complete and thorough search of the 
premises wherein the decedent resided and inquiries at seven-
teen banks in Utah and Salt Lake Counties were made (the 
most likely places that the decedent would have deposited 
any money if such deposit had been made) and that no 
evidence of money, bnk deposit books or safety deposit box 
keys was found to indicate that the decedent had ever re-
ceived the $4800.00 in question. 
13 
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It is the contention of the respondent that the evidence 
of the case clearly supports and proves the allegations of an 
unlawful detainer action, including the fact of nonpayment 
as shown by the actions of the decedent and testimony of 
witnesses during the trial in the lower court. 
It is often said that the burden of proof is upon the party 
having in form the affirmative allegation, but the burden of 
going forward with the proof shifts many times during the 
trial from one party to another party. In the instant case the 
appellants claim payment as an affirmative defense in their 
pleadings; therefore, the burden of going forward to con-
vince the trier of facts that payment was made shifts to the 
appellants. The appellants were the parties who presumably 
had the peculiar means of knowledge which would enable 
them to prove payment but this in fact they failed to do. 
All throughout the appellants' brief they have labored 
extensively on speculation and fanciful imagination, even quot-
ing statements of the court as to what could have been, or which 
probably was, which statements were made prior to the court's 
finding and judgment. 
The following decisions clearly indicate that such state-
ments have no bearing upon the court's final finding and judg-
ment: 
"Oral antecedent expressions of opinion by a trial 
court inconsistent with findings, conclusions and de-
cree ultimately rendered in writing do not affect the 
final judgment." 
In Re Roth's Estate, 269 P 2nd. 278, 2 U. 2nd. 40. 
"Oral statements of opinion by the Trial Judge 
made in connection with a ruling do not constitute 
14 
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findings nor judgment and will not modify or affect 
them if the ruling, findings, order or judgment is 
otherwise sound.'' 
Wheat v. Denver R. G. & W. RR. Co., 2500 P. 2nd 
932. 
"At the conclusion of the evidence the curt rendered 
an oral opinion expressing his views . . . Such opinion 
of course is not the decision of the case and may not 
be regarded as such ... the decision of a case consists 
of the findings, conclusions, and decree; . . . such rea-
sons are not binding on the reviewing Court and may 
not be considered as controlling the findings nor as 
supplying a want of them," 
Stevens & Wallis v. Golden Porphyry Mines Co., 18 
P. 2nd 903, 904 81 U. 414. 
"Oral statements of opinion by the trial court in-
consistent with the findings and conclusions ultimately 
rendered do not affect the final judgment." 
McCollum v. Clothier, 241 P. 2nd 468, 472. 
Also to the same effect, Palfreyman v. Bates & Rogers Con-
struction Co., 108 U. 142, 158 P. 2nd 13·2. 
In the McCollum case the court greatly exceeded the state-
ment of the Court made in the instant case prior to judgment. 
in that it orally informed the defendants that it would rule 
in defendants' favor, stating that it would not be necessary 
for the defedants to procure an additional contemplated wit-
ness. It later developed that the court changed its mind and 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff even though defendant's con-
templated witness died without being given opportunity to 
testify and the decision was nevertheless upheld by the 
Supreme Court in the following words: 
15 
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"The fact that the trial court changed his mind and 
entered a judgment contrary to his orally announced 
decision at the time the case was submitted, cannot be 
the basis for overturning the judgment. The only 
judgment that can be given effect is the one entered 
in acordance with law. * * * no antecedent expres-
sions of the judge can in any way restrict his absolute 
power to declare his final conclusion, in the only manner 
authorized by law, to wit, by filing his decision (find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law * * *" 
McCollum v. Clothier, 241 P. 2nd P. 472 
The findings of fact by the trial court pertinent to the 
issue in question was that the defendants did not pay to the 
plaintiff's decedent during the month of August, 195 3 the 
sum of $4800.00. The above stated finding of fact was sup-
ported by abundant competent evidence. 
A Utah case decided in 1953 held that the Supreme Court 
cannot disturb the trial court findings of fact if there is any 
competent evidence to support the findings. Seamons vs. An-
derson, 252 P. 2nd 209. 
Other Utah cases where the same doctrine is applied are: 
Beagley vs. U. S. Gypsum Co., 235 P. 2nd 783. 
T acea Tsouras vs. Brighton & North Point lrrig Co., 227 
P. 2nd 329 
Garrett Freight Lines vs. Cornwall, 232 P. 2nd 786 
Williams vs. Ogden Union Ry & Depot Co., 230 P. 2nd 315 
It has been further held that: 
"The Supreme Court will not redetermine facts 
found by the fact finder in a lower court in law cases 
16 
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if, in the light most favorable to the respondent, the 
evidence is sufficient to sustain such findings." 
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Guthrie, 256 P 2nd 706. 
"On appeal, prevailing party in case at law is en-
titled to benefit of evidence in light most favorable to 
him, together with every inference and intendment 
fairly and reasonably arising therefrom." 
Nasner v. Burton, 272 P. 2nd. 163, 2 U. 2nd 236. 
Also W eenig Bros. v. Manning, 262 P. 2nd, 491, 1 U. 
2nd 101. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE PLAIN-
TIFF'S CASE AND FOR JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFEND-
ANTS ATER BOTH PARTIES HAD RESTED SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASON THAT 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A 
JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF AND THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTD BY THE DEFENDANTS WAS NOT PRIMA 
FACIE EVIDENCE OF PAYMENT AND WAS REFUTED 
BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
What we have stated under Point One is also applicable 
to Point Two. 
The appellants contend that by the introduction of de-
fendants' exhibit No. 3 they had proved a prima facie case of 
payment and that the respondents did not offer any scintilla 
of evidence to rebut the exhibit. 
17 
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Respondents deny appellants' contention on both counts. 
The case of Gallaher vs. T heilbar Realties, 18 P. 2nd 1101, 
93 Mont. 421, cited by the appellants in support of their ar-
gument may be distinguished from the case at hand in that 
the court was called upon to determine as a matter of law 
whether or not the uncontradicted evidence to the effect that 
an individual agreed to settle in court an account by paying 
part thereof in cash and giving his personal note for the bal-
ance, and that the other party upon receipt of the cash and 
note voluntarily receipted the statement of the account,· con-
stituted payment. Whereas in the instant case the appellants 
are asking this court to determine the sufficiency of the evi-
dence of respondents which was most certainly abundant and 
contradictory to that of the appellants. 
The evidence recited in Point One pertaining to the cir-
cumstances and conduct of the deceased after the date of the 
alleged payment and prior to the date of his decease; the 
failure of the defendants or appellants to reply to a demand 
for payment or to make any statement whatsoever for over 
a month after the alleged payment; the testimony of Thomas 
F. Kirkham, Administrator of the Estate of William Kirkham, 
deceased, relating to the Spencer contract; the bank deposit 
books; the testimony of the heirs relating to the search of 
decedent's belongings; the testimony of Attorney Harvard 
R. Hintor and all other evidence submitted on behalf of the 
respondents clearly contradict and rebut the so-called evidence 
of defendants' exhibit No. 3. 
The physical evidence of defendants' exhibit No. 3 shows 
that the signature only was in decedent's handwriting and it 
18 
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un~ was stipulated by the appellants that the body of this exhibit 
,Wl. was not in the decedent's handwriting. As a matter of fact, 
~ ~, the signature and body were written by different pencils as 
~:, well as by different hands. 
t an~ 
:eo:· 
:r:.:: 
The trial court in its analysis of the case states, "It is 
more than passing strange, that where a receipt is written in 
lead pencil, at a time when $4800.00 was being paid, that the 
payor, or someone in his behalf would use one pencil to make 
the body of the receipt, and the signer would then use another 
pencil in signing his name thereto." 
There was not one scintilla of evidence offered by the 
appellants concerning their exhibit No. 3 with relation to any-
thing other than the signature. There was no evidence pre-
sented concerning the drafting of this exhibit, the place of 
payment, means of payment, or any evidence whatsoever sur-
rounding this exhibit other than the signature. 
When the physical facts of this exhibit are considered in 
light of the facts determined by the evidence as presented in 
Point One and elsewhere throughout this brief, speculation 
as to what might have been or which was probably done ceases 
to be. We are then left with the findings of fact by the court 
that the claimed payment of $4800.00 was never paid, and 
that the receipt, defendants' exhibit No. 3·, even though it 
bears the true signature of the decedent (which gives full 
credit to defendants' only evidence) is false, forged and coun-
terfeit, which findings are clearly supported by abundant, 
competent evidence. 
Appellants certa~nly did not prove by any preponderance 
of evidence a genuineness of any receipt. The findings by the 
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court based on competent evidence that defendants' exhibit 
No. 3 is false, forged and counterfeit places the appellants' 
arguments concerning a so-called "receipt" outside of the scope 
of the issues before this court as all of appellants' arguments 
presuppose a valid receipt whereas a genuine receipt supported 
by evidence never existed, as was determined by the court. 
The Utah cases cited under Point One holding that the 
Supreme Court cannot disturb the trial court's finding of fact 
if there is any competent evidence to support the findings is also 
applicable here. 
A very recent Utah case, Kimball Elevator Co. v. Elevator 
Supplies Co., 272 P. 2nd 583, 2 U. 2nd 289, states: 
"On appeal from judgment for plaintiffs, Supreme 
Court was required to take all the evidence and every 
reasonable inference therefrom in light most favorable 
to plaintiffs." 
* The general rule is that a verdict willl not be set 
aside on the ground of insufficiency of evidence if the 
evidence substantially supports it. "There must be 
an absence of evidence against the defendants 
or a decided preponderance in his favor. In other 
words, the v erdict must be plainly wrong and mani-
festly against the weight of the evidence to warrant 
the court in setting it aside." 
People v. Swasey, 6 U. 93, 21 P 400 
Also see United States v. Brown, 6 U., 115, 21 P. 461 
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POINT THREE 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-OPENING THE 
CASE ON ITS OWN MOTION AND IN DESIGNATING 
THE MANNER, KIND AND AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE 
THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED BY THE COURT. 
The mere fact that appellants have been unable to find 
authorities to support the action of the court in matters of 
reopening the case where the initiating source was the court 
itself certainly does not make it an abuse of discretion on the 
part of the court. 
That a judge has no burden or duty to call forth evidence 
is plain in the law. But the general judicial power itself, ex-
pressly allotted in every st ate constitution impries inherently 
a power to investigate as auxiliary to the power to decide; and 
the power to investigate implies necessarily the power to 
summon and to question witnesses. If the court has such in-
herent power then the power to reopen a case on its own 
motion in order to make a proper judicial determination cer-
tainly must be one of its inherent powers. 
Respondent agrees with the appellants that a broad lati-
tude and discretion is allowed the trial court in reopening a 
case. 
Appellants' contention that a motion to reopen is always 
made by one of the parties and is ordinarily based on newly 
discovered evidence is not shared by the respondent. 
It was held in Holn vs. Pauly, 106 P. 266, 11 Cal. App. 724, 
"Where, after submission, the judge, after suggest-
ing it himself, reopened the case for further evidence, 
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it will be presumed that it was in furtherance of a 
desire to reach a just conclusion upon the merits, and, 
both parties having the same opportunity to offer addi-
tional evidence, he will be deemed to have acted within 
his discretion, especially where it is at least doutbful 
whether the additional evidence strengthens materially 
the successful party's case." 
That a court may of its own motion reopen a case is 
implied from the following: 
·'Where the court reopens the case on motion, the 
character of the showing made in support of the 
motion is immaterial, since the court may, of its own 
motion, reopen the case." 88 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
220 par. 104. 
See also Badoner vs. Guaranty Trust, etc., Bank, 200 P. 
638; and Rutledge vs. Barger, 255 P. 537. 
That the court did not abuse its discretion could not be 
more clearly stated than the following statement from 88 
Corpus Juris Secundum 222, par. 106: 
"It cannot be considered an abuse of discretion to 
reopen a case for further evidence where the adverse 
party suffers no injustice, or where the court permits 
him the same latitude in introducing further evidence 
where it is necessary to reopen to supply evidence 
material to the case and necessary for its proper dis-
position, or where the evidence is newly discovered." 
Mohawk Carpet Mills v. State, 17 N. Y. 2nd 780 
Chapman v. Associated Transport, 63 S.E. 2nd 465. 
How can the appellants contend they were harmed or 
prejudiced when they were granted the same opportunties 
and latitudes as the respondents. The fact that they did not 
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avail themselves of this opportunity was not prejudicial to 
their interest when they were granted the same rights and 
privileges as were the respondents. 
There is no conflict as to the broad latitude and discretion 
allowed a trial court in matters of reopening a case. 
The appellants contend that there was a clear abuse of 
discretion in that the Court itself initiated the reopening of 
the case in order to hear further evidence necessary to the 
ends of justice. 
An appellate court will interfere only where there has 
been a clear abuse of discretion. How can there be such a clear 
abuse when the sole purpose of reopening was in the further-
ance of the interest of justice and both parties given equal op-
portunities to offer evidence and be heard ? 
A judge is not a mere passive figure who must rely solely 
upon the actions of attorneys for his determinations. He may 
even on his own call forth witnesses and interrogate them 
in order that the ends of justice may be met. 
The following excerpts from 53 Am. fur. 109-110, Sec. 
123, 124, state very clearly the broad discretion allowed a trial 
court in matters of reopening a case: 
''While a party should in gtvmg his evidence in 
chief, offer all evidence at his command in support 
of his case, and as a general rule is thereafter con-
fined to rebutting evidence, it is within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court in the furtherance of the 
interests of justice after the parties have rested to 
permit either party to reopen a case, for the purpose 
of receiving further evidence. . . . In the discretion 
of the Court a case may be reopened and additional 
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evidence introduced after a motion for a nonsuit or 
for a directed verdict, after a demurrer to the evi-
dence has been made, or during argument of counsel, 
even after the conclusion of the argument. The exi-
gencies of each particular case go far in controlling 
the discretion of the court in this regard, although it 
has been said that the court should not reopen a case 
except for good reasons and on proper showing, it 
is not, on the other hand, justified in closing the case 
until all the evidence, offered in good faith and neces-
sary to the ends of justice, has been heard. 
" ... An appellate court will interfere only where 
there has been a clear abuse of discretion." 
"It is common practice for the trial court to allow 
the case to be reopened and additional evidence intro-
duced in order to prevent a nonsuit, where counsel for 
the plaintiff has omitted evidence by accident, inad-
vertence, or even because of a mistake as to the neces-
sity fo.~ offering a particular witness or particular evi-
dence. 
It is further stated in 88 C. J. S. 224 Sec. 108 that: 
"It is within the sound discretion of the Court 
whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened 
for the further introduction of evidence after a motion 
or request for a nonsuit, to set aside the verdict, di-
rected verdict, judgment, dismissal, peremptory in-
struction, or a demurrer to the evidence,· or withdrawal 
of the case from the jury, and the case may be reopened 
after the court has announced its intention as to its 
ruling on the request, motion, or demurrer, or has 
granted it, or has denied it, or after the motion has 
been granted, if the order has not been written, or 
entered on the minutes or signed. In the exercise of 
this discretion the court should reopen the case to 
receive evidence inadvertently omitted, or evidence 
the admission of which is necessary for the proper and 
just disposition of the case." 
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The appellants contend that the attorney is the best 
judge of what evidence he desires the court to hear. 
But is is discretionary with the court what further evi-
dence it will hear after the case has been reopened. 88 C.J.S., 
226, par. 110. Aling v. Weissman, 59 A. 419. 
In view of the broad powers granted to a trial court to 
further the ends of justice and the fact that the appellants were 
not prejudiced by the court's order or denied equal opportunities 
with the respondents, there can be no such clear abuse of 
discretion which would justify interference by an appellate 
court. 
The evidence offered after the reopening of the case was 
clearly in the furtherance of justice to enable the trial court 
to render a just and proper decision. The fact that the appellants 
did not avail themselves of their opportunity to offer evidence 
does not render the trial court action a clear abuse of discretion. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON 
THE ERRORS OF LAW COMMITTED BY THE COURT. 
The decision or judgment of the trial court was supported 
by sufficient legal evidence to justify the same and it was ac-
cording to law. 
There were no errors of law occurring at the trial which 
would be prejudicial to the plaintiffs. 
A recent Utah case, Burton v. Zions Cooperative Mer-
cantile Institution, 249 Pac. (2nd) 514, states: 
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''The matter of granting or refusing a new trial 
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the 
judgment thereon should be reversed only when there 
has been a plain abuse of said discretion." 
Other Utah cases holding to the same effect are: Callahan 
v. Simmons, 64 Utah 250, 228 P. 892; Lund v. District Court, 
90 Utah 433, 62 P. 2nd. 278; Hepworth v. Covey, 97 Utah 
205, 91 P. 2nd. 507. 
In Beck v. Dutchman Coalition Mines Co., 269 P 2nd 867, 
2 U. 2nd 104, it was held that: 
"Trial courts have wide latitude in granting or deny-
ing motions for new trial." 
"Order overruling motion for new trial must stand 
unless it is made affirmatively to appear that trial 
court erred." 
Moulton v. Staats, 83 U. 197, 27 P 2nd 45. 
What we have stated about the other points also applies 
to Point Four. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein stated, the judgment of the Lower 
Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLENN M. ACOMB 
and 
HARVARD R. HINTON 
26 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
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